Empirical Moral Theory

Empirical Moral Theory (EMT)

Reasons for a new moral theory:

The EMT attempts to address the shortfalls of moral realism and moral anti-realism. For the sake of simplicity I will define moral realism primarily in terms of the claim that objective, mind-independent moral truths exist. I will refer to these truths as moral facts. Conversely, moral anti-realism denies the existence of moral facts.

Moral realism is attractive because it asserts that moral facts are discoverable, and the truth of these moral facts is independent of human opinion. Moral imperatives can carry far more weight if they refer to objective facts, as opposed to subjective opinion. However, moral realism suffers from serious flaws, one of which is lack of evidence. If there are moral facts that are mind-independent, what then imbues the moral fact with truth? Whence does the “ought” originate?

Moral anti-realism appears far more defensible, as it does not assert the existence of mind-independent moral truths. The position does make a positive claim about the nonexistence of mind-independent moral facts, which suffers similar problems to strong atheism’s outright denial of gods. There is little room between realism and anti-realism for remaining agnostic about the existence of moral facts due to lack of evidence. Moral anti-realism is also difficult to draw general conclusions from in practice, and many people find moral arguments made from an anti-realist perspective to be unconvincing.

The EMT seeks to improve upon both positions by assuming nothing about the existence of moral facts, and focusing instead on pre-existing values and empirically testable hypotheses.

One could argue that the EMT is not meaningfully distinct from Utilitarianism, however this is not entirely true. Utilitarianism asserts that we ought to maximise good universally. There have been several attempts to justify this, although it’s often treated as axiomatic. Justifying this assertion is a fundamental problem for Utilitarianism. The EMT neatly sidesteps this problem by making no such assertion: instead, all moral prescriptions made by the EMT are framed in terms of existing values held by the individual or group in question.

Other attempts have been made to capitalise on the strengths of moral realism while remaining within an empirical framework. Sam Harris notably claimed that moral facts are accessible to the scientific method. Where I think he fails is in capturing the nuances of the distinction between moral facts (as mind-independent truths) and facts about moral beliefs. To maintain credibility, we must avoid assuming universality of any value, and we must recognise the origins of any moral ought.

The upshot of the EMT is this: Once a common ground of shared values is established in a discussion, moral propositions are no longer a matter of opinion; they are a matter of evidence and scientific enquiry.

Characteristics:

The EMT assumes no moral rules, axioms or value judgements to be true or preferable. It assumes no objective moral facts/truths, although it doesn't rule out the possibility.

The EMT is concerned with observations about what people value, and the different ways these values may be applied.

Moral Propositions with EMT:

All moral propositions with EMT must refer to existing or assumed values. Such a proposition would follow the form, "If a person values X, what derived moral principles & actions should they follow in order to optimise and remain consistent with X?"

Observations:

·         We observe that people have values and moral rules (these are distinct concepts). An individual's values may be inconsistent with their moral rules or their behaviour. Additionally, values may compete with one another.

·         Moral rules tend to follow directly from values. This is because people prefer to have consistency between their values, their moral rules, and their actions.

·         Most people value personal happiness (although the specifics vary between individuals). Most people also value pleasure and not-suffering. These values are so common as to be virtually universal among humans.

·         People tend to prefer to subscribe to a set of general moral principles. An advantage of general principles is that they can apply to unknown/unanticipated situations. Another advantage is simplicity (when compared to a large set of special-case rules). We might believe a principle like "suffering is bad" is true in general, even if we might not feel bad for every instance of suffering that we hear about. The justification for such a moral principle seems to follow when inductive reasoning is applied to all the cases of suffering that we have previously felt were wrong.

·         If a moral principle is informed by evidence and sound reasoning, it has a greater likelihood of producing actions that are not regrettable in hindsight.

·         We often prefer not to think about moral consequences beyond those in their immediate proximity, because to do so may threaten our comfort, self-image, finances, ability to indulge without guilt, plans, or liberty. We may subscribe to a moral principle (e.g. "suffering is bad"), but choose not to apply it consistently. Then, in order to maintain a sense of consistency and moral justification, we must employ cognitive dissonance. This can often be less than ideal.

Hypotheses:

·         Knowledge about others' situations, perspective-sharing and proximity all increase empathy (i.e. value-transferability). This should be empirically testable.

·         Virtually everyone values their personal happiness. Our beliefs & assumptions about what will make us happy are often (usually?) incorrect in retrospect. Watch this TED Talk by Dan Gilbert for some more on this idea. Empirical analysis may show that practising empathy and considering others' preferences produces more happiness than a more selfish or cognitive-dissonant approach.