The basis for empathy -- pleasure-seeking and suffering-avoidance -- is not rational. Our value of those things is hard-wired and instinctual. But given that people & animals do value these things, is the application of empathy rational?
My contention is that empathy results from understanding, and a lack of empathy results from incomplete understanding. If I do not feel what another person feels, I haven't fully understood their perspective. If it's rational for me to take action to avoid my own suffering, then it's rational to help others avoid suffering, whether I *feel* empathy or not.
I think lots of intelligent people end up dismissing empathy because it doesn't appear to have a rational basis. Granted, it does *seem* to be based on an emotion. But let's think about what's rational. Is it rational to take my hand off a stove's hot-plate after accidentally placing it there? Sure. I was suffering with my hand on there. Given that I have this pre-existing value of not suffering, the rational course of action is to take my hand off the hot-plate.
The point where it's difficult to intuitively see why empathy is rational is when suffering/pleasure is separated from our own experience. So let's add a degree of separation: Let's say I'm on some dissociative drugs, and I experience my hand on the hot-plate as though it's happening to someone else. I know my other self would want to remove the hand, because he is either suffering right now, or will definitely suffer later. But I'm in control. And I don't have a pressing reason to act, because I'm not suffering right now, in my dissociated state. So, is it rational to remove my hand from the hot-plate? I understand that part of me is suffering (and certainly I will suffer later), and I understand that this suffering is subjectively bad. If I fully understood my other self's suffering (i.e. felt the full force of it), I can be reasonably certain that I would be motivated to take action.
We could extend that degree of separation to arbitrary levels (a person drowning in front of you; people being persecuted elsewhere in your country; people starving in another country). The reasoning is the same. Why place value on something I'm not presently feeling empathy for? And why should one scenario "deserve" more of my empathy or consideration than another? Does my proximity to suffering have ethical weight (practical considerations aside)?
I have to decide whether to act on my current, limited perspective, or on the larger perspective (inclusive of others' suffering), which I know to be there. Not feeling empathy is a kind of ignorance. Does that ignorance justify an inconsistent, selfish application of the principle: suffering == bad? I would suggest it doesn't. To disregard others' suffering is to value the ignorant state over the less-ignorant state. I can choose to value the limited perspective, or I can value the complete perspective.
To think about it another way: Is my criteria for taking action such that I will take action based on the knowledge of suffering alone? Or do I need to also feel that suffering (via empathy) to take action? I think the knowledge itself is sufficient.
No comments:
Post a Comment